

Renewable energy and CO₂ policy

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With thanks to Gerard Dijkema and Emile Chappin

Renewable energy in the EU

- 20% of energy from renewables in 2020
 - most opportunities in the electricity sector
- Annual turnover renewable energy sector > 15 billion €
- > 300,000 employees
- fast growth
- but currently still small share

Reasons for stimulating renewable energy

- Security of supply
- Environmental benefits
 - Climate
 - Other environmental aspects
- Develop the learning curve for renewable energy technology
 - Development is a function of installed renewable energy capacity, not of time
 - The sooner we move through the curve, the larger the social benefits
- Stimulate renewable energy industry

How are renewable energy goals achieved?

- EU objectives are translated into national targets.
- CO₂-market → price advantage for renewable energy.
- Consumer demand for 'green' energy.

Types of policy instruments

- Price versus quantity...
- Feed-in tariffs: fixed price per unit of supplied energy
- Required percentage renewable energy
 - in supply
 - or in consumption
- Tenders: government purchases renewable energy
- Fiscal incentives


Comparison

	Feed-in	Quota	Tenders	Fiscal incentives
How it works				
Incentives				

Who does what in the EU?

Feed-in tariffs


Quota obligation



EU-15

Feed-in tariffs

Quota obligation



EU-10 +
BU&RO

Source: Interim Report, OPTRES: Assessment and optimisation of renewable support schemes in the European electricity market (Ragwitz et al., 2006)

Harmonisation of renewable energy policy

- Tool: guarantees of origin
 - certificates that indicate how electricity was generated
- Problem: definitions...

Goals:

- Achieve EU goals for renewable energy
- Transparency
- Cost effectiveness
- Increase trust by investors
- Allow member states certain room for their own policy

Guarantees of origin

- Verification of green origin of product
- Facilitate international market in green energy
- Count contribution of countries to renewable energy targets
- Stimulate renewable energy

Greenhouse emissions continue to increase

- Since 1990, emission fluctuates around 215 billion ton CO₂-equivalents
 - there is no structural reduction.
- EU depends on instruments such as emission trading and projects in developing countries to meet its Kyoto-obligation.
- In the period 1990-2004 the emission of CO₂ increased by 13% to 179 Mton
- So far, the rising CO₂ emissions have largely been offset by reductions in non-CO₂ greenhouse gases.

Problem: emissions are an externality

- “An externality or spillover of an economic transaction is an impact on a party that is not directly involved in the transaction” (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality>)
- Consumers do not realize full cost of energy
 - they do not use it optimally (waste it)
 - producers have no incentive to reduce externalities (emissions)

Neo-classical economics: internalize social costs in price of product

- Internalize the 'negative' external effects' in production, consumption, the economic system.
- Technical intervention: emission standards, product standards
- Economic intervention: provide *financial* (dis)incentives
 - Objective: influence consumption and production; or the production process
 - Levies/taxes to internalize costs
 - Or subsidies to offset competitive disadvantage of desired alternatives
- Indirect methods: communication, stimulation of innovation

Two classic instruments: price versus quantity

- Price and quantity are the two key variables in (neo-classical) economics
- The idea is to fix one of the two and leave the other to the market
- CO₂ taxation
 - Pigouvian Tax
 - Problem: What is the right tax to achieve a target?
- CO₂ emission trading
 - Creating a market solves part of the information problem (the market generates a price signal)

CO₂-emission trading

- Introduction
- Transition – creating the market
 - Policy
 - Economy
 - Legislation
- Current Practice
 - Trading systems
 - Effect on economic sectors
- What lies ahead – outlook for 2013 and beyond

Climate Policy

- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
- Kyoto-protocol (1997) :
 - the industrialized nations have agreed to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases
 - in the time period 2008-2012
 - Reference: emission in 1990.
 - European Union: 6.5%, the Netherlands 6%
- Does not stipulate *how* emissions reductions are to be achieved

EU-Directive 2003/87/EC

- Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC.
- EU: different targets per member state
- Timeline:
 - from 1997: emission trading for NO_x
 - 2005: trade in Member States; “learning period”
 - 2008: trade between Member States; Kyoto-targets
 - 2012: Aviation under EU-ETS
 - 2013: EU-ETS 3rd phase; post-Kyoto

Which activities are subject to the Directive?

- Installations for the conversion of energy
 - Combustion installations > 20 MW (excluding waste incineration facilities)
 - Crude oil refineries
 - Cokes ovens
- Installations for:
 - Metal production from primary ores and secondary materials
 - Production of cement, glass and ceramics
 - Pulp, paper and board manufacture
- From 2012 on: aviation (2008/101/EC)

Economic ratio

- Trading CO₂ emissions is “a generally accepted method to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases at the lowest possible costs”
- When would this hold? Under which conditions?
- When does the price of CO₂ lead to sufficient reduction?
- Neo-classical economic perspective!
 - Create scarcity, and the “invisible hand” of the market will work its way (?)
 - **The market generates a price (= information!)**

CO₂-emission trading – market design

- Objective
 - Industrial society in NL / EU:
 - Reduce CO₂ emission where the costs are lowest “via the invisible hand”
 - Market design
 - Optimal price formation
 - Minimize transaction costs
- Realization
 - Market system
 - New rules and regulation (legislation), roles and institutions

Two possible market designs

- Performance Standard Rate (PSR) system
- Cap and Trade system

Performance Standard Rate (PSR) system

- CO₂ emissions are compared to a reference value:
 - the emission per unit of product (or energy)
 - total emissions not fixed
- Emitter must possess a total of rights equal to the actual emission related to its products
- Start system: determine the reference values (per product or per activity)
- Subsequently: trade in emission rights
- Emitters who emit more than the reference must purchase additional rights, those who perform better may sell rights.

Cap and trade system

- The total volume of CO₂ emissions is fixed (Cap)
 - in EU: cap per Member State
- Each emitter must acquire emission rights for its CO₂ emissions.
 - member states determine allocation method
- Start system:
 - auctioning
 - or free allocation of rights (grandfathering)
- Subsequently: trading of emission rights

Market design issues – both systems

- Transaction costs to get/maintain the system in operation
- New institutions and roles required
- Introduction will lead to a shift in or end to activities


Market design issues - cap and trade:

- Choice of start up arrangements / allocation of rights (which become financial assets)
- How to determine / modify the cap? scarcity = price = response of emittants & stakeholders
- Trade handel between sectors will lead to a change of industrial economic structure;

Market design issues - PSR

- Setting the reference value is de-facto allocation of profit/losses (cash-flow)
- The portfolio of activities in the economy becomes also a function of the (annual) reference value
- Absolute volume growth always remains possible

Governance




Roles for the government

- Creation of the system: Objectives, participants, principles; 'free-riders', criminal behavior etc.?
- Start-up of the system:
 - Create required organizations; (NEA: Dutch Emission Authority).
 - Design allocation system for emission rights
- Trading:
 - Enable and register transactions
 - Monitor emissions and rights
- Supervision and enforcement

THE COST CURVE PROVIDES A “MAP” OF ABATEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Cost of abatement, 2030, €/tCO_{2e}*



Abatement
Gt CO_{2e}/year


* Cubic feet of carbon equivalents.
Source: McKinsey and Vattenfall analysis

ETS in werking (1.1.2005)

CO2-marktprijzen

jc@emissierechten.nl 12 sept. 2005

forwards & spot markt;
11 registers on-line




CO₂ Emission rights: prices

- May 14th 2009: OTC= Eur. 14.63



www.pointcarbon.com



ETS after 2012 – EU assessment


- EU ETS: putting a price on CO₂ *works*
- *excessive allocation* of allowances when verified data became available; “market reactions”
- 2nd phase: cap is set to induce reductions
- variety in National Allocation Systems
- attention to “fair competition” and “market distortion”.


EU ETS after 2012


- to become more efficient:
 - 8 year instead of 5 years
 - constantly reducing cap; 21% by 2020 from 2005
 - allocation: linear increase of auctioning (4%→70%)
- more harmonized:
 - EU-wide cap
 - no National Allocation Systems!
- fairer:
 - new entrants, new Member States

Question

- Does CO₂ cap and trade lead to the desired investments?









Game A

Market price per round




Game A

Company value per round




Game B

Market price per round




Game B

Company value per round




Game C

Market price per round



Game C

Company value per round





Dynamic environment

- Changing rules:
 - market integration
 - renewables policy
 - CO₂ policy
 - perception of nuclear energy
 - etc.
- Focus on impact of CO₂ policy:
 - investment under changing circumstance
 - a long-term transition


Question

- From your experience in the game, which CO₂ policy do you think would be better:
 - the current European cap-and-trade policy
 - fixed number of emission allowances, market determines allowance price
 - a CO₂ tax
 - fixed price for CO₂, emitters decide whether to reduce emissions







Impact is caused by difference in portfolio evolution – no intervention



Impact is caused by difference in portfolio evolution – emission trading



Impact is caused by difference in portfolio evolution – carbon taxation



Conclusions

- Emission reduction:
 - Carbon policies deliver in the long run.
 - The first 10-15 years, CO₂ emissions continue to increase
 - Without intervention, emission levels grow dramatically
- Electricity prices / investment risk:
 - Higher investment risk can cause an investment cycle under emission trading.
 - Carbon taxation leads to lower electricity prices than emission trading.
- Both instruments create pain today.
- Affordable and competitive low-CO₂ electricity generation options must become available on a large scale.