Introduction to Aerospace Engineering

Lecture slides



Design & certification approach Safe life, fail safe, damage tolerant

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AVIGABILITE DE TYPE

MUSTERZULASSUN

ERTIFICS

Faculty of Aerospace Engineering 23-12-2011

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Challenge the future

Introduction Outline of lectures/lecturer

- 9/11
 16/11
 23/11
 23/11
 30/11
 7/12
 14/12
 4/1
 Material physics & properties / environment Structures
 Loads
 Materials & manufacturing
 Selection of materials & structures / space
 Design & certification / fatigue & durability
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Learning objectives Student should be able to...

- Explain the role of the three responsible parties in aviation
- Describe the three major design philosophies



• What is safety?





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- What is safety?
- How do you measure safety?
 - Fatalities per passenger kilometre?
 - Fatalities per flights/hours?
 - Fatalities per flights kilometre?

Deaths per billion journeys		Deaths per billion hours	
Bus	4.3	Bus	11.1
Rail	20	Rail	30
Van	20	Air	30.8
Car	40	Water	50
Foot	40	Van	60
Water	90	Car	130
Air	117	Foot	220
Bicycle	170	Bicycle	550
Motorcycle	1640	Motorcycle	4840



- What is safety?
- How do you measure safety?
 - Psychological aspect (one large accident vs. several smaller accidents)
 - Large fluctuations per year
 - No distinction routes, operators, range, age of aircraft
 - Safety level established for every new aircraft type



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- What is safety?
- How do you measure safety?
- Relation to structural safety?
 - Limited amount related to structural failures (~70% human factors)





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Structural safety Interaction of disciplines

- Jointly responsible parties
 - Manufacturer
 - Operator
 - Authority





Safety requirements Structural requirements

- Requirements related to
 - Strength (resistance to failure and standards with regard to risks)
 - Load cases (exact 'estimation' of the external forces on the aircraft during its life)
 - This 'estimation' relates to acceptance of risks:

Risk	Load case
Event 1	External forces
Event 2	External forces
	•••



Safety requirements Structural requirements

- Requirements related to
 - Strength (resistance to failure and standards with regard to risks)
 - Load cases (exact 'estimation' of the external forces on the aircraft during its life)
 - Life time!
- The unit of time
 - 'Flights' seems more relevant than 'flying hours'
 - 'Flying hours' often easier for aircraft operator (in relation to planning)
 - Each part has its own unit of lifetime depending on type of lifetime reducing factor (fuselage pressurization vs. engine part rotation)



Safety requirements Structural design philosophies

- Safe life
- Fail safe
- Damage tolerance



- 1903: Wright brothers First aircraft types
 - Static strength design
 - Damage during service (fatigue, corrosion, accidental damage) is not taken into account





• 1930's: Introduction of metal structures

Safe-life of a structure is the number of flights, landings, or flight hours, during which there is a low probability that the strength will degrade below its design strength.



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• 1930's: Introduction of metal structures

Safe-life of a structure is the number of flights, landings, or flight hours, during which there is a low probability that the strength will degrade below its design strength.

- Design life with reserve/safety factor
 - Fatigue failure is not likely to occur during design life
 - At the end of its design life the aircraft component is scrapped/replaced
- Because aircraft were obsolete before design life was reached approach worked



• Fatigue becomes an issue when...



- Fatigue becomes an issue when
 - Increase of design lives (economic reasons)
 - Increase of loads (higher altitude \Rightarrow cabin pressure)
 - Improvement of (accuracy of) methods (smaller margins/safety factors)
 - Application of stronger materials, but with poor fatigue properties, crack growth and residual strength



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- 1954: Two Comet accidents
 - Fuselage exploded at cruising altitude
 - Crash after 1286 and 903 flights
 - Crack started from ADF windows





- 1954: Two Comet accidents (design)
 - High stress levels
 - Material choice not optimal (notch sensitivity)
 - Corner crack from window (large effective crack)





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- 1954: Two Comet accidents (testing)
 - Full scale test performed \Rightarrow cracks observed after 16000 flights!
 - Same test article as static test (2∆p) for economic reasons (Local plasticity ⇒ Stress redistribution ⇒ Unconservative test results)
 - Cabin pressure tests repeated on existing aircraft
 - \Rightarrow Failure after 3060 cycles
 - \Rightarrow Crack started from escape hatches
- "What are we testing?"







Fail safe Safety-by-design

- 1950's
 - Problems with Safe Life design (limited service lives of critical components)
 - Introduction of Fail-Safe concept

Fail-safe is the attribute of the structure that permits it to retain required residual strength for a period of un-repaired use after failure or partial failure of a principal structural element.





Fail safe Safety-by-design

- Failure of a primary member by fatigue or otherwise must not endanger flight safety
 - Emphasis on `multiple structural member concept'
 - Static strength analysis of various damage scenarios
 - Each structural item adequate Safe-Life
- Economically more viable than safe-life concept
- In time damage detection possible (increase safety)
- From service experience:

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- Not all failure modes anticipated.
- No partial failure anticipated.



• Multiple Site Damage (MSD): Fail Safe ineffective (aging aircraft)



Damage tolerance Safety-by-inspection

• Since 1978 in FAR/JAR

Damage Tolerance: The ability of the structure to sustain anticipated loads in the presence of fatigue, corrosion or accidental damage until such damage is detected through inspections or malfunctions and is repaired.

- DT concept is not a replacement: Combination of Safe Life, Fail Safe and Damage Tolerance needed!
- Damage and imperfections assumed to be present (from day 1)
- Damage (fatigue, corrosion, impact) until detection and repair (restore to UL)
- Sufficient durability (economics)



Damage tolerance Safety-by-inspection

• Aloha airlines accident (1988)

- Cause: MSD (Multiple Site Damage)
 in riveted joint
- Operation in warm, humid, maritime air
- Joints were susceptible to corrosion, operator informed by Boeing (*insufficient inspection!*)







Durability Design philosophies

- Modern structural design must satisfy:
 - Damage Tolerance
 - Durability

Durability: The ability of the structure to sustain degradation from sources as fatigue, corrosion, accidental damage and environmental deterioration to the extent that they can be controlled by economically acceptable maintenance and inspection programs.

 Recall lecture on Environmental Aspects & sandwich panel examples in lecture on Structures!



Damage tolerance Design approach

Critical location (primary structure)



• NB: Safe life is only allowed for landing gear and attachments



Damage tolerance Design approach

Experimental substantiation

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• NB: Virtual testing ≠ testing (not allowed for certification)

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Summary

Design & certification approach

- Three parties involved in aviation safety
- Design philosophies
 - Safe life
 - Fail safe
 - Damage tolerance

