### **Chapter 20. Application to Politics: Strategic Voting**

- Definitions
- Examples
- Agenda-Setting
- Impossibility Theorem





- How do we assist voters in casting votes in accordance with their choices?
- How do we assist process designers in creating voting mechanisms which encourage the true expression of preferences?
- How can we assist in the study, analysis and mediation of political processes?

# **Voting and its Relevance**

- The engineering process entails collecting requirements
  from stakeholders
- These requirements may be seen as votes for a collective solution
- Thus, the questions are relevant to technology designers
- Designers are therefore much concerned with questions involving the expression and reconciliation of preferences in an open setting
- Note that we could also be discussing policy design, governmental elections, committee processes or legislative processes here

# **Sincere Voting and Sophistication**

- *Sincere voting* means selecting your preferred candidate in a vote
- *Sophisticated voting* means voting with an eye towards engineering preferred outcomes
- A procedure for which you are made better of by voting sincerely is known as *strategy proof*
- A procedure preventing you from communicating with others to your mutual advantage is known as *coalition proof*

# **Admissible Strategy**

- An admissible strategy is one which is not dominated
- In one-shot elections voting for your last-place candidate is never admissible
- Voting for your second best candidate may be admissible if you would otherwise be stuck with the worst candidate



# Sequential Pairwise Voting and Agenda-Setting

- We may subject candidates to a run-off
- Or, we may otherwise request participants vote in a series of *sequential pairwise* votes, also known as a tournament
- The order in which we submit the candidates is known as the *agenda*
- Exercise 20.3 provides an example where agendasetting allows any option to be selected at the discretion of the agenda setter or process designer



# **Examples for Analysis**

<u>1970 New York Senate Election</u> 1980 U. S. Presidential Election

- Reagan, Carter and AndersonAnderson split the vote on the left
- <u>1988 U.S. Financial Assistance</u> to Contra Rebels
- •Illicit attempts to support the Contra rebels discovered
- •Explicit aid deliberated in the House of Representatives



#### 1 July 2010

Image in public domain, downloaded from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President\_at\_a\_Rall y\_for\_Senator\_Durenberger\_in\_Minneapolis\_1982.jpg



### **Finding Sophisticated Voting Outcomes**

- Consider which players stand to loose by sincere voting
- Recognize that choosing second-best outcomes can be an instrument for improving your overall outcomes
- Identify those second-best outcomes for those players that you have identified
- Evaluate whether making those second-best choices can in fact cause a shift in the vote



# **Engineering the Agenda**

Recognize that for n items in the agenda, there are n! possible agendas

So for instance for four choices there are twenty-four possible agendas (4!=4\*3\*2\*1=24)

- Enumerate all possible agendas
- Work through each agenda systematically as needed
- **Engineer** the emergence of unpopular choices by creating tournaments where all viable alternatives are lost by sincere voting
- Engineering specific outcomes often possible depending on preference structure



# **Impossibility Theorem**

- Kenneth Arrow (1951)
- No voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking
- Resulted in dismay on the part of engineers and policy analysts
- Let's take a look at what the theorem says and does not say

### **Arrow's Axioms**

The impossibility theorem is axiomatic

- Unrestricted Domain: All voters must be presented with real choices
- **Transivity:** Consistent ordering of preferences
- Non-Dictatorship: No dictators
- Pareto Efficiency: Unopposed preferences should be adopted
- **Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:** Best choices remain best even if new choices are offered which are not best

# **The Impossibility Theorem**

Does not preclude

- Communities which already have a consensus
- Feasible designs within an otherwise circumscribed space of solutions
- Designers or individuals making choices as they see fit

