

Chapter 3.

Matrix Games: Mixed Strategies

- What is the Minimax Theorem?
- What are Mixed Strategies?
- How do you Solve for Mixed Strategies?
- Solving Arbitrary N by N Game Matrices

Pure Strategies and Mixed Strategies

- **Pure strategies** involve choosing one and only one of the potential strategies available to the player
- **Mixed strategies** involve choosing a mixture of the possible strategies available to the player, such that the mixing proportions sum to 100%

Recommending Mixed Strategies in Play

- Optimum play in some games entails mixed strategies
- Players choose among their strategies in the recommended fixed proportion of the mixed strategy
- Some game theorists are troubled by the concept of mixed strategies since they believe it lacks descriptive validity
- Others suggest that there are other criteria for decision-making being used, not modeled in play
- Further, and as we will see, mixed strategies are dependent on utility measurements

Active Strategies

- Mixed strategies need not mix in all the strategies which are available to the player
- Those strategies which are recommended to be used are **active strategies**
- When all strategies are active, the resultant mixed strategy is **totally mixed**

Expected Value of a Strategy

- Mixing proportions are effectively probabilities
- We calculate the expected value of a mixed strategy by multiplying probabilities from the mixed strategies by pay-off, and summing

Example Calculation of Expected Value

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	2	-3
	B	0	2
	C	-5	10

Suppose Colin adopts a mixed strategy of 71.4% A / 28.6% B

- Expected Value of Rose Strategy A:
 $71.4\% (2) + 28.6\% (-3) = 0.571$
- Expected Value of Rose Strategy B:
 $71.4\% (0) + 28.6\% (2) = 0.571$
- Expected Value of Rose Strategy C:
 $71.4\% (-5) + 28.6\% (10) = -0.710$

Example taken from Game Theory and Strategy (Straffin 1993) p.16

Three Methods for Solving Mixed Strategy Solutions

- **Method of Equalizing Expectation:** A mixed strategy for the column player must result in equivalent payoff in active row strategies. Results in solving simultaneous linear equations.
- **William's Oddments:** A shorthand algebraic calculation for finding mixed strategies
- **Graphical Method:** Plotting pay-offs which result from a mix of opponent strategies. Good for $N \times 2$ or $2 \times N$ game matrices.

Equal Values of Expected Strategies

- Note how Rose's two active strategies offer the same expected value – 0.571
- This is no coincidence
- The expected values of all active strategies must be equivalent, or they would not be part of the equilibrium
- By definition, an equilibrium cannot be bettered; if one of the active strategies offered a better expected payoff it should be chosen exclusively

Example of Equalizing Expectations


		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	1	3
	B	2	-6

- Is there a mixed strategy for Colin $(x, 1-x)$?
- Rose strategy A results in expected value $1(x)+3(1-x)$ or $3-2x$
- Rose strategy B results in expected value $2(x)-6(1-x)$ or $8x-6$
- Can we find x such that $3-2x = 8x-6$? Yes.
 $10x = 9$
 $x = 0.90$

Example of Graphical Method

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	6	1
	B	-5	5

Strategic Form Game



Graphical Solution of Game


Example Williams Oddments

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	-9	-4
	B	-4	-10

Row Differences

$$(-9 - -4) = -5$$

$$(-4 - -10) = -6$$



Rose oddments

6

5

Rose probabilities

6/11

5/11

Calculate
Row
Differences

Step #1

Take
Absolute
Value

Step #2

Swap

Step #3

Add
oddments

Step #4

Divide
Through

Step #5

Guidelines for Solving Arbitrary Game Matrices by Hand

- Simplify the matrix using dominance
- Check for saddle points
- If there are no saddle points, then check for mixed strategies
- If mixed strategies fail then you must identify active strategies
- Use the graphical method on $(2 \times n)$ or $(m \times 2)$ strategies
- The graphical method eliminates all passive strategies