Chapter 31. The Nucleolus and Gately Point

- Nucleolus
- Gately Point
- Optimization Solutions



In Brief



U.S. Army photo by Army Pfc. Eric Liesse (public domain, usgov)

- Grease the most squeaky wheel until it squeaks as little as possible
- The Nucleolus treats all coalitions as equally important
- The Gately point attempts to secure the most valuable coalition members as best as possible



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Nucleolus and Gately variants

- The Nucleolus treats all coalitions as equally important (Schmeidler, 1970)
- The Gately point attempts to secure the most valuable coalition members as best as possible (Gately, 1974)
- Both variants of the "squeaky wheel"



The Excess

Define the excess as

$$e_s(\mathbf{x}) = \nu(S) - \sum_{i \in S} x_i$$

 The excess is always specified for a given coalition S



Interpreting the Excess

- The excess is defined as the difference between what the coalition could earn alone, and the amount they are awarded by others
- As defined, a positive quantity when underfunded, and a negative quantity when overfunded
- Interpretable as "the unhappiness" of the coalition

A Graphical Solution



An Empty Core

The Nucleolus



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Solution Concepts

- Guided Search:
 - Set the excess of the grand coalition to zero.
 - Then minimize the next greatest value, keeping all other excesses constant.
 - Proceed down the list until no more improvements possible.
- Graphical / Geometrical: Often easiest when working with three-player games.

The Propensity to Disrupt

Define the propensity to disrupt as

$$d_i(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} x_j - \nu(N-i)}{x_i - \nu(i)}$$

- The propensity is always specified for a given player i
- May be extended to coalition S, in which case the solution is called the *disruption nucleolus*

Interpreting the Propensity to Disrupt

- "If I desert the grand coalition, I'll lose something, but you'll loose a lot more!"
- In words: propensity to disrupt is the ratio between what you loose and what I loose when I desert
- Thus I'm more likely to disrupt if I have nothing to loose, or if you are gaining a lot from my cooperation

Solving for the Gately Point

- In order to minimize disruption you must find an imputation so that the propensity for disruption is equal for all players
- The required payoff for all players is then proportional to

$$\nu(N) - \nu(N-i)$$

• This is the marginal value of player i to the supercoalition N

A Graphical Comparison

$$v{A} = v{B} = v{C} = 0$$

$$v{AB} = 80 \quad v{AC} = 60 \quad v{BC} = 90$$

 $v{ABC} = 100$

Solution Proportional to Disruptive Capability

100 — 90: 100 — 60: 100 – 80 1:4:2 14:58:38



The Gately Point

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Example Nucleolus Optimization

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